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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) re-
forms have become a major focus of governments and corporations over 
the past several decades. In the United States, for example, following the 
Enron scandal and the recent financial crisis, both government and pri-
vate industry have become embroiled in debates about the role of corpo-
rate governance in causing such crises and the corporate governance so-
lutions to prevent future crises. Similarly, some investor groups, em-
ployee groups, and corporations themselves have advocated for or under-
taken numerous CSR efforts. These efforts focus not just on shareholder 
wealth maximization, but also on the broader impact of the corporation 
on its stakeholders. 
These debates are not just occurring in developed economies. 
Countries around the world are engaging in rich and nuanced debates, 
and undertaking significant reforms in the corporate governance and 
CSR arenas. This Article focuses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and CSR reforms in India—the world’s largest democracy 
and one of its largest economies. Illuminating the trajectory of corporate 
governance and CSR efforts in India provides important lessons for 
reform efforts in other countries. 
Corporate law in India has been fundamentally transformed since 
the early 1990s. In conjunction with significant economic liberalization, 
the Indian government has introduced a series of corporate governance 
reforms aimed in part at creating a system of transparent, ethical, and 
accountable corporate functioning.1 Early reforms sought to implement 
rules and practices that addressed traditional corporate governance con-
cerns, in other words the relationship between firm managers and share-
holders and the relationship among different groups of shareholders, par-
ticularly majority and minority shareholders. 
These early reforms include mandatory corporate governance re-
quirements for listed companies that the Securities Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) introduced through the amendment of Clause 49 of the List-
ing Agreement of Stock Exchanges (Clause 49).2 They also include nu-
                                                 
 1. For a detailed history of developments in Indian corporate governance, see Afra Afshari-
pour, The Promise and Challenges of India’s Corporate Governance Reforms, 1 INDIAN J.L. & 
ECON. 33, 64–67 (2010) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges]; Afra Afsharipour, 
Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 335 (2009) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence]; Rajesh Chakrabar-
ti, Corporate Governance in India—Evolution and Challenges 20 (Jan. 17, 2005) (unpublished work-
ing paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649857. 
 2. CIRCULAR, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BD. OF INDIA, AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 49 OF THE 
LISTING AGREEMENT (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/ 
CIR422000.html [hereinafter AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 49 (2000)]; CIRCULAR, CORPORATE 
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merous attempts by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) to rewrite 
the Indian Companies Act (1956),3 to improve corporate governance, and 
to modernize India’s company law. Recent reforms, such as the MCA’s 
Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines (2009) (Corporate Gover-
nance Guidelines) have been more voluntary in nature, with the aim of 
encouraging companies to adopt better corporate governance practices.4 
More recently, not only has the Indian government implemented 
laws to address corporate governance matters, but it has also started ad-
dressing CSR. In 2009, in conjunction with the introduction of new cor-
porate governance guidelines, the MCA also proposed groundbreaking 
Voluntary Guidelines for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR Guide-
lines) in 2009.5 The CSR Guidelines attempt to capitalize on the long 
history of philanthropy by large Indian firms. There is a robust history of 
Indian companies stepping into areas where they believed the state was 
failing, such as in education, health, and rural development. For example, 
the Tata Trusts, which controls 65.8% of the shares of Tata Sons, the 
holding company of the Tata Group conglomerate, regularly uses its in-
come to support social causes.6 The wealth that accrues from this asset 
supports an assortment of socially responsible causes, such as institutions 
of higher education, medical research centers, and rural sanitation 
projects.7 The CSR Guidelines also attempt to move beyond a philanth-
ropic model of CSR to a more expansive view of CSR that envisions the 
integration of social and environmental issues into businesses’ decisions, 
goals, and operations, and in interactions between corporations and their 
stakeholders. 
Like India’s corporate governance reforms, the government’s recent 
CSR guidelines place much responsibility on corporate directors. India’s 
CSR Guidelines, along with the government’s various public statements, 
view directors from a Gandhian perspective as trustees with duties to 
                                                                                                             
GOVERNANCE IN LISTED COMPANIES—CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT (Oct. 29, 2004), 
available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcir0104.pdf [hereinafter CLAUSE 49 (2004)]. 
 3. The Companies Act, 1956, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 
 4. MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES 2009 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter CG GUIDELINES (2009)], available at 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CG_Voluntary_Guidelines_2009_24dec2009.pdf. 
 5. MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES 2009 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter CSR GUIDELINES (2009)], 
available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CSR_Voluntary_Guidelines_24dec2009. 
pdf. 
 6. See Bala N. Balasubramanian, Governing the Socially Responsible Corporation—A Gand-
hian Perspective, in ETHICS, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: MANAGING RESPONSIBLY (Ananda Das Gupta 
ed., 2010). 
 7. Id.; see also Our Commitment, TATA TRUSTS, http://www.tata.com/ourcommitment/ 
sub_index.aspx?sectid=i6eUTkvtRos= (last visited May 16, 2011). 
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shareholders, stakeholders, and society as a whole.8 Both the CSR Guide-
lines and expected changes to the Companies Act would place the onus 
on the board of directors to supervise a company’s CSR policies and to 
provide public reports on such policies, including the amount of profits 
spent on CSR efforts.9 
India’s corporate governance and CSR reforms have both, in large 
part, pinned their hopes on independent directors. In the corporate gover-
nance realm, the reforms envision independent directors as serving both 
a monitoring function and an advisory function. But while the indepen-
dent director model has much to recommend, and there is some evidence 
of the markets assigning a positive value to independent directors on 
boards of Indian companies, there are serious constraints to relying on 
this model in the Indian context. It is clear that without significant addi-
tional reforms, the independent director model will not fully address the 
most important corporate governance concern in India: the pervasive in-
fluence of controlling shareholders (in the Indian context these share-
holders are commonly referred to as promoters). 
This Article argues that the Indian government’s corporate gover-
nance and CSR efforts, while laudable in some respects, are problematic 
in their approach to the governance of Indian companies and reflect a 
view of the ownership and governance of Indian companies that does not 
necessarily address the fundamental governance issues that arise in In-
dian firms. India’s proposed corporate law reforms suggest imposition of 
detailed corporate governance rules without necessarily assisting direc-
tors in addressing the fundamental majority–minority agency problems 
of controlled companies. Moreover, India’s proposed CSR guidelines 
may further hamper independent directors and exacerbate some of the 
problems that this Article discusses with respect to majority–minority 
agency costs. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I explores the ownership 
structure of Indian firms and the role of independent directors in the go-
vernance of Indian firms. Part II assesses India’s corporate governance 
reform efforts, and addresses whether these efforts relieve the corporate 
                                                 
 8. Gandhi’s view of the ownership of capital was one of trusteeship motivated by the belief that 
society was essentially providing capitalists with an opportunity to manage resources that need to be 
managed on behalf of society in general. See MEERA MITRA, IT’S ONLY BUSINESS! INDIA’S 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 20–25 (2007). In a recent 2010 
interview, the chairman of the MCA stated that directors and senior management are “custodians of 
public money, they are the trustees—if we go to the Mahatma Gandhi concept of trustee-
ship . . . . They are actually the trustees of the nation.” Interview by Jitendra V. Singh with R. Ban-
dyophadyay, Chairman, Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs, available at http://knowledge. 
wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4488. 
 9. See CSR in India: Govt not to set CSR Floor for India Inc, INDIA CSR, Dec. 25, 2010, 
http://www.indiacsr.in/article-1760-CSR-in-India-Govt-not-to-set-CSR-floor-for-India-Inc.html. 
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governance concerns in Indian firms. Part III investigates the origins and 
development of CSR in India and assesses recent attempts to incorporate 
CSR into corporate law, particularly through imposing CSR-related obli-
gations on independent directors. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. OWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE BOARD 
Corporate law scholars generally argue that the nature of corporate 
governance concerns differ based on the ownership structure of firms.10 
While for publicly owned firms with diverse ownership the governance 
concern is primarily about the agency costs of management vis-à-vis 
shareholders, for firms with controlling shareholders the “fundamental 
concern that needs to be addressed by governance arrangements is the 
controlling shareholder’s opportunism.”11 Additionally, in controlled 
family-owned entities, various family members often serve in executive 
management or board positions. Thus, minority shareholders of con-
trolled entities are often concerned with self-dealing transactions and 
other types of expropriation or extraction of wealth (tunneling) by major-
ity stockholders.12 But minority shareholders generally have limited 
power to affect the activities of the controlling stockholder through con-
testing control, voting rights, or pressuring the board of directors.13 There 
is also some concern that the prevalence of pyramidal ownership by fam-
ily business groups14 with considerable economic power can affect vot-
ing by minority shareholders and even institutional investors, due to such 
shareholders’ business ties with the group.15 
A. Ownership of Indian Firms 
Like other Asian countries, concentrated ownership dominates the 
Indian corporate landscape.16 Until relatively recently, Indian firms had 
                                                 
 10. For an overview of the differences between controlled and non-controlled companies, see 
Lucien A. Bebchuk & Assef Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1263, 1281–85 (2009). See also John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law? in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 31 (R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed., 
2009); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 785 (2003). 
 11. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 10, at 1282. 
 12. See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, (2000) (defining tunne-
ling as the “transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically 
also a top manager)”). 
 13. See Bebchuck & Hamdani, supra note 10, at 1281–83. 
 14. See Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or 
Parasites?, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 331–73 (2007). 
 15. See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders 1, 3 
(2010) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641138. 
 16. See Rajesh Chakrabarti, William Megginson & Pradeep K. Yadav, Corporate Governance 
in India, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 59 (2008); Lee Kha Loon & Angela Pica, Independent Non-
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little dependence on global capital markets for funds, as family business 
groups controlled the majority of large companies and financial interme-
diaries played minor roles in firm ownership. Even following economic 
liberalization, family-group ownership (and its accompanying control 
and conflicts of interest issues) remains a mainstay of India’s corporate 
landscape.17 According to a 2006 study, nearly 60% of India’s 500 larg-
est companies were affiliated with family business groups.18 For compa-
nies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Sensitive Index (Sensex), 
which represents the top thirty companies and accounts for nearly a fifth 
of the BSE’s total market capitalization, nearly a third were family 
owned and controlled.19 
Because of the ownership structure of Indian firms, controlling 
shareholders (i.e., promoters) play an important and pervasive role in 
Indian corporate governance.20 A 2005 study of over 3,000 Indian com-
panies found that nearly half the market capitalization of those compa-
nies was directly held by the promoters.21 This study additionally sug-
gested that the actual holdings likely exceed half, given that promoter 
shareholding is often hidden in the form of other corporate bodies or in-
dividual shareholders. In one case, the address provided by a company 
for a non-promoter corporate shareholder actually turned out to be that of 
the company’s chairman.22 Regardless of how frequent such hidden hold-
                                                                                                             
Executive Directors: A Search for True Independence in Asia, CFA INST. CENTRE FOR FINANCIAL 
MARKET INTEGRITY CODES, STANDARDS, AND POSITION PAPERS (2010), available at 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2010.n1.1. 
 17. Satheesh Kumar T. Narayanan, Indian Family-Managed Companies: The Corporate Go-
vernance Conundrum, 5 ICFAI J. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 20 (2006), available at http://unpan1. 
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan033971.pdf. 
 18. See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 1, at 59. 
 19. Narayanan, supra note 17, at 40. In smaller listed companies on the BSE, which makes up 
the largest portion of listed companies, family members generally own more than 50% of the com-
pany’s shares. See LALITA SOM, STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
7 (2006). 
 20. Under Indian law, “promoter” and “promoter groups” are defined to include: 
(i) the person or persons who are in overall control of the company, (ii) the person or per-
sons who are instrumental in the formulation of a plan or program pursuant to which se-
curities are offered to the public, and (iii) the person or persons named in the prospectus 
as promoters. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (ISSUE OF CAPITAL AND DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS) REGULATIONS 2(1)(za) (Aug. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/ 
guide/sebiidcrreg.pdf. 
 21. K.S. Chalapati Rao & Atulan Guha, Ownership Pattern of the Indian Corporate Sector: 
Implications for Corporate Governance 11 (Inst. for Studies in Indus. Dev., Working Paper No. 
2006/09, 2006), available at http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/wp0609.pdf; see also Shaun J. Mathew, Hostile 
Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and Regulatory Opportunities, 2007 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 800, 833 (2007) (noting that as of December 31, 2006, average ownership percentage of 
BSE 500 companies was 49.55%). 
 22. Rao & Guha, supra note 21, n.20. 
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ings actually are, it is clear that concentrated ownership still dominates 
the Indian corporate landscape. 
There has been some shift in the concentration of ownership of In-
dian firms, with non-promoter institutional investors, both Indian and 
foreign, making significant inroads in the ownership of large Indian 
firms.23 It is much too early, however, to state that the ownership pattern 
of Indian firms has changed dramatically. 
B. The Role of the Board in Controlled Companies: 
The Indian Experience 
1. The Role of Directors in Controlled Companies 
Just as the corporate governance concerns in controlled entities may 
differ from those in widely held firms, the role of the board, and particu-
larly the role of independent directors on the board, also has important 
nuances in controlled firms. For controlled entities, outside directors 
serve what have been seen as “two broad, and sometimes opposing, 
roles”: as (i) monitors of controlling shareholders that work on behalf of 
minority shareholders; and (ii) brain trust, consultant, or “strategic advi-
sor to the controlling shareholder.”24 
In their monitoring role, outside independent directors can help ad-
dress corporate governance concerns of controlled entities. The monitor-
ing role of independent directors is particularly important in jurisdictions 
like India, where the legal rights of minority stockholders may be li-
mited. In controlled entities, independent directors can help prevent 
business decisions that improperly benefit controlling stockholders at the 
expense of minority stockholders. For example, they can monitor related-
party transactions, in which there is a controlling stockholder conflict of 
interest.25 In addition, independent directors can help protect the interests 
of minority shareholders and reduce extractions by controlling share-
holders through “publicizing, or threatening to publicize, majority share-
                                                 
 23. See Chakrabarti et al., supra note 16, at 62. But see Rao & Guha, supra note 21, at 18 (stat-
ing that institutional investor holdings are very small for many companies). 
 24. Vikramaditya Khanna & Shaun J. Mathew, The Role of Independent Directors in Con-
trolled Firms in India: Preliminary Interview Evidence, 22 NAT’L L. SCH. OF INDIA REV. 35, 45 
(2010); see also Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
73, 80, 81 (2007). 
 25. See Clarke, supra note 24, at 81; Deborah A. DeMott, Guests at the Table?: Independent 
Directors in Family-Influenced Public Companies, 33 J. CORP. L. 819, 847 (2008); Jeffrey N. Gor-
don, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and 
Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1506 (2007); Khanna & Mathew, supra note 24, at 45. 
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holder abuses” even if the directors have limited power to decide impor-
tant issues without consent of the controlling stockholder.26 
In controlled companies with significant family influence, indepen-
dent directors may also help navigate “difficult questions that implicate 
family ties as well as business necessity, including management succes-
sion and external threats to the firm’s position and separate existence” 
and may help the board “focus on the corporation’s business despite the 
distracting influence or overhang of frictions internal to the founding 
family.”27 Independent directors may also influence board action to be 
more formal, professional, and transparent, especially in family-
controlled firms that can be tempted to operate informally.28 
Scholars have also recognized that in controlled entities, outside di-
rectors may serve as strategic advisors to the controlling shareholder.29 
Such directors may help controlling shareholders and management with 
business decisions, and may offer strategic business advice and links 
with other entities.30 Some scholars have argued that while corporate go-
vernance norms have moved toward outside directors as monitors of con-
trolling stockholders, “it would appear that the strategic advisory role 
may be more suited to the actual functioning of boards, given that few 
boards meet more than once every two months.”31 
2. Independent Directors in India 
How does the reality of Indian boards line up with the academic 
theory about the role of boards in controlled entities? As will be dis-
cussed in Part II, corporate governance standards in India have under-
gone fundamental changes over the last two decades. Publicly listed In-
dian companies are required to have boards composed primarily of direc-
tors that can be deemed as independent under the stock exchange gover-
nance rules. These rules not only require independent board members, 
but also envision an expansive monitoring role for such directors. While 
the legal rules have been put into place, it is not yet clear whether direc-
tors themselves envision an expansive monitoring role. 
                                                 
 26. Clarke, supra note 24, at 81; see Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 10, at 1295; Khanna & 
Mathew, supra note 24, at 46. 
 27. DeMott, supra note 25, at 824. 
 28. See id. at 857–58; Khanna & Mathew, supra note 24, at 46. 
 29. See Khanna & Mathew, supra note 24, at 46; Clarke, supra note 24, at 81; Gordon, supra 
note 25, at 1514. 
 30. See Clarke, supra note 24, at 99–100 (noting that such outside directors are not always 
considered to be independent directors). 
 31. Khanna & Mathew, supra note 24, at 47; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the 
Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 161 (2010) (arguing that informational asymmetries inherent 
in the role of independent directors may limit their ability to be effective monitors). 
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A broad survey of corporate governance practices of Indian firms 
found significant room for improvement in the function of independent 
directors. For example, Indian law does not currently require director 
nominations by an independent nominating committee of the board, thus 
directors are typically nominated by controlling stockholders. This nom-
ination process allows the “appointment of friends or colleagues of pro-
moters or controlling shareholders as nonexecutive/independent direc-
tors.”32 Therefore, there is concern that such directors may not be truly 
independent and may have “a sense of loyalty to the controlling share-
holder, potentially rubber-stamping proposals and disregarding minority 
shareholder interests.”33 
In addition, once nominated, it is not clear that independent direc-
tors possess the skills or tools necessary to address oppression of minori-
ty shareholders by majority stockholders. Many independent directors 
lament that there is no formal training for directors, and worry that the 
lack of training and resources may undermine their effectiveness.34 
Several recent studies of independent directors in India confirm that 
the role of directors in Indian firms is still in a state of development. One 
particularly illuminating study performed a broad survey of and inter-
views with independent directors at leading BSE 100 companies in In-
dia.35 Based on their preliminary results, the authors found that indepen-
dent directors of such companies envisioned their role to be as strategic 
advisors to controlling stockholders, rather than as monitors representing 
the interests of minority shareholders.36 In fact, most directors reported 
little communication or contact with minority shareholders.37 Directors 
cited several reasons for not functioning in a monitoring role, including: 
the lack of time, resources, or training; concern that performing as moni-
tors could undermine board collegiality and functioning; and the high 
potential for direct liability.38 
                                                 
 32. Corporate Governance Review of Practice: A study of Corporate Governance Practices in 
Leading Corporates in India, NAT’L FOUND. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Dec. 2007, at 52, 
available at http://www.nfcgindia.org/pdf/asci250808.pdf. 
 33. Loon & Pica, supra note 16, at 1. 
 34. See id. at 3. 
 35. See Khanna & Mathew, supra note 24. 
 36. See id. at 38–39. 
 37. See id. at 39. 
 38. See id. at 37. 
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II. INDIA’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME 
A. Clause 49 and the First Phase of India’s Corporate 
Governance Reforms 
The needs of India’s rapid economic growth drove the country’s 
corporate governance reforms.39 Large Indian firms and industry groups 
advocated for the adoption of corporate governance standards that mir-
rored standards in more developed countries in order to obtain access to 
foreign direct investment, institutional investors (both domestic and for-
eign), and global capital markets.40 Beginning in the late 1990s, industry 
groups such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) advocated for 
comprehensive corporate governance standards.41 While India’s corpo-
rate governance reforms were initially spearheaded by corporate India, 
the government, through SEBI, responded relatively quickly to industry 
demand by adopting Clause 49.42 
The adoption of Clause 49, a seminal event in Indian corporate go-
vernance, established a number of governance requirements for listed 
companies with a focus on the role and structure of corporate boards, 
internal controls, and disclosure to shareholders. The reforms introduced 
by Clause 49 “closely aligned to international best practice at the time 
and set higher governance standards for listed companies than most other 
jurisdictions in Asia.”43 The hallmark of Clause 49 was the introduction 
of independent directors into the Indian corporate governance system. 
Clause 49 includes a requirement that all listed companies have indepen-
dent directors and sets forth some specific duties and obligations for in-
                                                 
 39. For an overview of India’s economic transformation since 1991, see ARVIND PANAGARIYA, 
INDIA: THE EMERGING GIANT 107 (2008). 
 40. See Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present and Future?, 1 
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 171, 182 (2009); Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corpo-
rate Governance Reforms Increase Firms’ Market Value: Evidence from India 9 (Univ. of Mich. 
Law Sch., Olin Working Paper No. 07-002, Oct. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
914440. 
 41. CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CODE, 
(1998), available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CII_Code_ 1998.pdf. 
 42. AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 49 (2000), supra note 2; CIRCULAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN LISTED COMPANIES—CLAUSE 49 OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT (Aug. 26, 2003), available at 
http://web.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2003/cir2803.html [hereinafter CLAUSE 49 (2003)]. The Listing 
Agreement with stock exchanges defines the rules and processes that companies must follow in 
order to remain listed companies on an Indian stock exchange. 
 43. ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION, ACGA WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 9 (2010), available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/ACGA_India_ 
White_Paper_Final_Jan19_2010.pdf. 
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dependent directors.44 These reforms were phased in over several years, 
and now apply to thousands of listed Indian companies. 
While Clause 49 introduced reforms that are quite laudable, it has 
come under some criticism by scholars and corporate governance ex-
perts. Despite much fanfare and threats of vigorous enforcement, even 
several years after its enactment, compliance with Clause 49 remains less 
than ideal. For example, a 2009 study found that “less than a fourth of all 
independent directors are really independent in the sense that they have 
no connection with the promoters.”45 In addition, “more than 3,000 
people who were on the boards of various companies on January 1, 2006 
were re-designated as independent directors to comply with” Clause 49 
and “in around 30% of the companies, promoters simply re-designated 
themselves—calling themselves non-executive chairmen meant their 
companies could get by with a smaller proportion of independent direc-
tors (one-third, instead of half).”46 Moreover, Indian regulators have been 
less successful in enforcing Clause 49’s extensive standards than in es-
tablishing them. SEBI has brought few enforcement actions for breaches 
of Clause 49 and has not been particularly successful even for those ac-
tions that it has brought.47 
Clause 49 has also been criticized because it addresses agency costs 
between managers and shareholders—i.e., problems of dispersedly 
owned firms—rather than minority shareholder oppression that could 
result from the concentrated ownership structures in Indian companies.48 
Scholars have posited that some of the shortcomings of Clause 49 are 
due to the transplant of governance reforms adopted in the United States 
and the United Kingdom into the Indian context without a comprehen-
sive analysis of Indian corporate structures.49 In a recent article examin-
ing India’s corporate governance reforms and the ownership structure of 
Indian firms, scholar Umakanth Varottil has comprehensively demon-
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strated that “due to the concentrated ownership structures in Indian com-
panies, it is the minority shareholders who require the protection of cor-
porate governance norms from actions of the controlling shareholders. 
Board independence, in the form it originated, does not provide a solu-
tion to this problem.”50 In fact, even those arguing that listed companies 
in India “are well regulated” admit that “oppression and mismanagement 
will remain always and [will need] to be tackled carefully.”51 
B. The Second Phase of Corporate Governance Reforms 
India’s corporate governance reform efforts did not cease with 
adoption of Clause 49. The MCA, which is responsible for overseeing all 
Indian companies and administering the Companies Act, has made sev-
eral attempts to undertake a comprehensive revision of the Companies 
Act (1956).52 The MCA’s attempts to revise the Companies Act were 
revitalized in 2009 following the massive accounting scandal at Satyam 
Computer Services.53 The MCA’s revisions to the Companies Act have 
received extensive review by the Parliament but have yet to be enacted 
into law.54 In conjunction with the overhaul of the Companies Act and as 
a response to the Satyam scandal, the MCA introduced the Corporate 
Governance Guidelines. 
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1. The Corporate Governance Guidelines 
Following the massive accounting fraud at Satyam Computers, the 
MCA proposed the Corporate Governance Guidelines, a set of good 
practices that may be voluntarily adopted by Companies.55 The Corpo-
rate Governance Guidelines address a myriad of corporate governance 
matters including: independence of the board of directors; responsibili-
ties of the board, the audit committee, and auditors; secretarial audits; 
and mechanisms to encourage and protect whistleblowing. Like prior 
corporate governance reforms in India, the Corporate Governance Guide-
lines emphasize the role of independent directors. 
The Corporate Governance Guidelines do propose important re-
forms to address the independence of directors and the ability of inde-
pendent directors to monitor controlling stockholders. In order to address 
the influence of controlling stockholders on the director nomination 
process, the guidelines propose the establishment of a nomination com-
mittee, a majority of which will be independent directors, including its 
chairman, for evaluating and recommending appropriate candidates for 
directorships to the board.56 The Corporate Governance Guidelines set 
forth important details regarding the manner in which the nomination 
committee ought to function, with a focus on objectivity and transparen-
cy.57 Scholars have argued that while a nomination committee is a step in 
the right direction, given the concentration of ownership and voting 
power in Indian firms, the appointment of such a committee may not sig-
nificantly protect the interests of minority stockholders.58 Indeed, “the 
nomination committee will likely pick candidates who have the tacit ac-
ceptance of the controlling shareholders so that the successful outcome 
of election of such candidates is not in doubt.”59 
Given that the Satyam scandal involved a foiled related-party trans-
action, the Corporate Governance Guidelines also make some inroads 
into addressing related-party transactions.60 The guidelines require that 
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the audit committee of the board of directors: (i) should monitor and ap-
prove all related-party transactions, and (ii) should provide public disclo-
sure about all related-party transactions that take place in a particular 
year.61 Scholars have noted that the recommendation that the audit com-
mittee approve and monitor related-party transactions “is a substantial 
step in providing checks and balances against extraction of value from 
the company by controllers and other insiders.”62 But such a step may not 
be sufficient to protect minority shareholders from expropriation since 
the audit committee is not required to be composed of only independent 
directors and since there is no requirement that minority shareholders 
approve related-party transactions.63 
Overall, reaction to the Voluntary Guidelines by Indian corporate 
law scholars has been mixed, with one noted scholar stating that, “while 
the Guidelines do contribute to enhancement of the existing corporate 
governance framework in significant ways, they fail to satisfactorily ad-
dress some of the shortcomings in the prevailing regime that have sur-
faced in the recent past.”64 
2. Amendment of the Companies Act 
Since shortly after the approval of Clause 49, the MCA has at-
tempted to reform the Companies Act to reflect more rigorous corporate 
governance provisions for all Indian companies. To date, the MCA has 
commissioned two separate committees to examine the Companies Act 
with respect to corporate governance provisions.65 The reports of these 
committees have led to proposed amendments to the Companies Act, 
although such amendments have not yet resulted in legislation. 
The MCA’s most extensive revisions to the Companies Act were 
introduced in 2008 and 2009. After years of delay in attempts to amend 
the Companies Act, the Companies (Amendment) Bill was introduced in 
the Indian Parliament in October 2008.66 But the bill failed to become 
law that year. On August 5, 2009, the Companies Bill (2009) was intro-
duced in the Lok Sabha (the directly elected lower house of the Indian 
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Parliament) in the same form in which it was presented in 2008.67 Com-
mentators were shocked that there were no substantive changes to the 
Bill, despite the Satyam scandal.68 Like the 2008 bill, the 2009 bill was 
left on the table. 
In August 2010, the Standing Committee on Finance of Parliament 
(SCF) examined the 2009 bill in great detail.69 The committee has made 
numerous recommendations to address India’s corporate governance 
shortcomings. According to the SCF’s report, the MCA has accepted that 
some of the matters included in the 2009 Voluntary Guidelines, dis-
cussed below, should be included in a revised bill. These include the se-
paration of the roles of chairman and chief executive, the attributes and 
tenure of independent directors, board evaluation, the appointment of 
auditors, and the rotation of audit partners and firms. In general, the 
SCF’s recommendations vest even greater authority and responsibility in 
independent directors. In terms of guidance to the MCA for amending 
the Companies bill, the SCF set forth the following guiding principles: 
“role of Independent Directors to be distinguished from other Directors 
in terms of appointment, duties and liabilities; maintenance of a panel 
recommended for their appointment; independence criteria to be clearly 
delineated; [and that] the institution to be allowed time to evolve.”70 Ac-
cording to some commentators, “while it is not doubted that the existing 
system of independent directors requires further review and strengthen-
ing, the SCF’s recommendations seem to go the other extreme in advo-
cating a process which amounts to regulatory micromanagement of cor-
porate boards.”71 
With respect to amendment of the Companies Act, there are ongo-
ing debates as to how to best address potential minority stockholder op-
pression. For example, in a recent press release, SEBI announced that it 
will recommend that the MCA amend the Companies Bill “to disallow 
interested shareholders from voting on the special resolution of the pre-
scribed related party transaction. This will protect small and diversified 
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shareholders in listed companies from abusive related party transac-
tions.”72 Scholars describe this proposal as an important step because 
under current Indian law there is little restriction on controlling share-
holder conflict of interest transactions. The Companies Act currently 
does not require shareholder approval for related-party transactions.73 
Some commentators have lamented, however, that SEBI did not impose 
such a restriction on listed companies which are subject to SEBI regula-
tions.74 
C. Continued Shortcomings in Indian Corporate Governance 
As apparent from the above discussions, despite significant devel-
opment in Indian corporate governance laws and regulations, 
what becomes increasingly apparent in India is that the reform 
process has not addressed, or effectively addressed, a key challenge 
at the heart of the governance problem, namely the accountability of 
promoters to other shareholders. For example, even though most 
listed companies have large controlling shareholders, typically a 
family, India has a notably weak regime governing related-party 
transactions. There is little protection of minority shareholders un-
der India’s legal regime, and no opportunity under the law for inde-
pendent directors or independent shareholders to approve large re-
lated-party transactions. Promoters have considerable freedom of 
action in undertaking such transactions. In this context, relying 
largely on independent directors (appointed by controlling share-
holders), independent board committees and greater corporate dis-
closure as the primary mechanisms to check abuses of power by 
promoters and to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders is 
likely to prove weak and insufficient. Board reform is fundamental-
ly important, and is a major issue of concern to investors, but it 
needs to be complemented by other regulations that directly address 
the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders.75 
A number of experts have offered suggestions to address the poten-
tial oppression of minority shareholders.76 These suggestions include: 
(i) altering the nomination and appointments process for independent 
directors; (ii) changing the election of independent directors to give a 
greater role to minority shareholders; (iii) encouraging investor activism; 
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(iv) clarifying the advisory and monitoring role of independent directors; 
and (v) increasing the qualifications and commitments of independent 
directors. 
One of the most recent and interesting set of recommendations has 
been put forth by the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA).77 The ACGA’s goal is to help address critical corporate gover-
nance areas that thus far “remain to be addressed—particularly relating 
to the accountability of promoters (controlling shareholders), the regula-
tion of related party transactions, and the governance of the audit profes-
sion.”78 According to the ACGA, the accountability of promoters to other 
shareholders is “a key challenge at the heart of the governance prob-
lem.”79 In order to increase this accountability, the ACGA presents a 
number of important reform suggestions including: (i) providing greater 
disclosure prior to meetings to better improve shareholder meetings and 
to empower institutional investors by providing for more systematic vot-
ing, and (ii) addressing related-party transactions by giving independent 
shareholders the power to approve large transactions and requiring the 
appointment of an independent financial advisory and an independent 
board committee to determine whether the transactions are fair and rea-
sonable to all shareholders.80 
The CFA Institute’s Centre for Financial Market Integrity has made 
similar recommendations to address the fundamental governance prob-
lems of controlled entities. The CFA Institute has recommended that mi-
nority shareholders who own a minimum threshold percentage of shares 
be given the right to directly nominate director candidates.81 It has also 
recommended that controlled firms adopt cumulative voting schemes so 
as to improve the ability of minority shareholders to nominate and elect 
board members.82 
As discussed in Part II.B, some of these recommendations have 
been taken into account in the MCA’s recent Corporate Governance 
Guidelines. Other recommendations have also been addressed in the pro-
posed overhaul of the Indian Companies Act. Overall, however, many 
experts have expressed concerns either about the shortcomings of the 
proposed changes to the Companies Act and, given the significant delays 
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in the amendment of the Companies Act, about the likelihood that such 
changes will be incorporated into Indian law.83 
III. INDIA’S CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
MODEL—THE INDIA WAY? 
In 2009, in conjunction with the introduction of the Voluntary 
Guidelines and the proposed overhaul of the Companies Act, the MCA 
also proposed groundbreaking CSR Guidelines. The CSR Guidelines 
attempt to capitalize on the long history of philanthropy by large Indian 
firms. The Ministry’s guidelines include a strong focus on ethics, which 
it tied back to Indian history and values. The guidelines also view direc-
tors from a Gandhian perspective—as trustees with duties to sharehold-
ers, stakeholders, and society as a whole. In fact, according to the head of 
the MCA, directors and senior management are: “custodians of public 
money, they are the trustees—if we go to the Mahatma Gandhi concept 
of trusteeship . . . they are actually the trustees of the nation.”84 
This Part begins by exploring the history of CSR by Indian firms. It 
addresses how the concept of CSR has developed in India. This Part then 
addresses the MCA’s recent efforts to incorporate CSR into Indian cor-
porate law, and the potential benefits and shortcomings of these efforts in 
light of the country’s corporate governance struggles. 
A. CSR by Indian Firms 
1. India’s CSR Roots 
It is a commonly held belief that CSR initiatives in India are driven 
in part by cultural norms and history.85 The images of Gandhi and his 
trusteeship model, Indian scriptural edicts, and long traditions of phi-
lanthropy are linked to modern CSR initiatives.86 Yet there is also skep-
ticism about culture as a driving force of CSR uptake. 
In her book, Stages of Capital, Ritu Birla gives insight into India’s 
charitable history that provides parallels to modern CSR initiatives.87 The 
merchant class of old paid tribute to the king to get real advantages, in-
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cluding commercial privileges, protection of trade routes, and exemption 
from duties.88 In the same way, CSR can be motivated by a desire to gain 
benefits from the government, including less scrutiny. Like the pre-
British kings, modern government may be less interested in the business 
motivations of merchant endowments.89 British rule brought the legal 
concept of trusteeship, which Gandhi built upon.90 During British rule, 
business groups began involving themselves with public social dis-
course.91 
The concept of trusteeship developed further during India’s inde-
pendence movement. “Gandhi’s view of the ownership of capital was 
one of trusteeship motivated by the belief that essentially society was 
providing capitalists with an opportunity to manage resources which 
need to be managed on behalf of society in general.”92 This view of trus-
teeship has been called revolutionary. According to an Indian CSR ex-
pert: 
[Gandhi’s view] was revolutionary in the sense that it was not just a 
guide to business functioning in society; it was an integral part of a 
wider world-view of society itself . . . . It was also revolutionary be-
cause it rested on a complete reformulation and in a sense negation 
of the twin aspects of capitalism as we know it—namely, the as-
pects of private property and competition. It was also revolutionary 
because, it still envisaged a future society, which could (in Gandhi’s 
view) emerge within the parameters of a market economy. . . . Most 
of all it was challenging because it tried to combine two opposites—
despite being anti-market in its approach, it proclaimed itself as not 
being anti-business.93 
Some large Indian business houses have long focused on philanth-
ropy and have within their business model a sense of a social mission. 
Many of India’s largest conglomerates have set up active separate phi-
lanthropic funds and welfare programs or initiatives, not necessarily as a 
legal duty or responsibility, but as a form of charity meant to indicate the 
virtues of the company or the organization.94 For example, two-thirds of 
all the profits made by Tata Group companies go into two charitable 
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trusts that support an assortment of socially responsible causes, institu-
tions, and individuals in a wide variety of areas.95 
2. India’s Emerging CSR Practices 
Over the past several decades, India began a shift from the philanth-
ropic model of social responsibility that predominated the era before li-
beralization, to a more Milton Friedman-style approach that focuses on 
the shareholders, and finally to the currently popular stakeholder model 
of CSR.96 The stakeholder model of CSR recognizes that companies have 
responsibilities to not only their shareholders, but also to their em-
ployees, customers, surrounding communities (including the environ-
ment), and society as a whole.97 Some commentators even argue that 
CSR is on the rise in India, with many firms conducting education, 
health, employment, skill development, affirmative action, and rural de-
velopment activities.98 Nevertheless, it is likely more accurate to state 
that for many Indian firms, CSR, particularly a more stakeholder-
oriented CSR model, is in the early stage of development.99 The shift to 
the stakeholder theory is not universal in practice—Indian businesses 
“continue to prefer to fund trusts and foundations at [arm’s] length from 
the company rather than integrating [CSR] practices into their core busi-
ness processes.”100 After deregulation, voluntary CSR activities have 
contributed to reducing skepticism; “there is a definite trend towards per-
ceiving the corporate CSR actions in a positive manner.”101 
Recently, some management scholars have argued that there is 
something unique about Indian business ideas, management practices, 
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and corporate leadership, particularly in the domain of CSR.102 Accord-
ing to a broad survey of Indian executives, many Indian firms have a 
sense of a social mission and purpose. These executives do not see 
shareholder wealth maximization as their primary goal. Instead, “they 
take pride in enterprise success—but also in family prosperity, regional 
advancement, and national renaissance. When asked about their priori-
ties, Indian executives ranked investor interests below strategy, culture, 
or employees . . . .”103 
Indian business executives advocate for CSR as a moral duty and 
goal, but they also “see the long-term business sense.”104 One study con-
cluded that there was a positive relationship between stock listing status 
and aggregate CSR; listed companies had higher levels of CSR efforts 
than unlisted companies.105 The study also found evidence that listed 
companies perform better than unlisted companies.106 It further found 
that companies that had more extensive CSR activities, taking into ac-
count various stakeholders, increased firm performance.107 
Some companies and commentators justify CSR as good business 
sense, as “tangible value creation that can be weighed equally for busi-
ness and society.”108 An employee-driven CSR program reportedly in-
creases employee satisfaction and productivity, and also improves em-
ployee skills.109 P.S. Narayan of Wipro states that increasing efficiency is 
the main reason to undertake CSR, pointing out that “the world’s most 
ethical companies are consistently the more profitable companies.”110 
Wipro chairman Azim Premji believes Wipro should go green internally, 
estimating the global market for environmental products and services 
will be over $2 trillion by 2020.111 Ajay Gupta of ruralnaukri.com has 
partnered with many NGOs to bring jobs and training to rural India, stat-
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ing that rural development can “provide momentum to the giant wheel of 
the economy.”112 Indeed, the purchasing power of rural consumers is on 
the rise; the average spending rate on many consumer goods is growing 
more quickly than average in rural markets.113 
Many businesses now actively trumpet the business case for CSR. 
ITC states that their CSR strategy centers on competiveness, improving 
customer satisfaction, and improving worker productivity.114 The Tata 
Group credits CSR for: an enhanced corporate image and added brand 
value; customer satisfaction and loyalty; access to quality business part-
ners; favorable access to capital markets; good relations with public au-
thorities and the general public; improved financial performance; in-
creased productivity, sales, and quality; increased ability to attract and 
retain employees; and the general confidence of customers, suppliers, 
employees, communities, investors, activist organizations, and other 
stakeholders.115 Others have echoed that the business case for CSR 
hinges on the stakeholder model.116 
There is a strong relationship between a corporation’s commitment 
to CSR and employee perception of CSR.117 India is seen to be more 
“collectivist than Western countries, which may have an impact on the 
importance of CSR to the Indian employee.”118 As such, it is likely that 
the business case for CSR is not universal.119 An Indian employee’s per-
ception of his or her company’s social responsibility is related to his or 
her pride in the company.120 Pride has a direct effect on satisfaction, 
creating a reduced intention to leave and improving perceptions of career 
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success.121 Actual career success is not as important as satisfaction with 
the organization in reducing intention to leave, possibly due to cultural 
factors.122 Indian employees may not place the blame on the organization 
if they do not achieve career success.123 One study on customer-facing 
employees found that CSR and job satisfaction help with recruiting em-
ployees, but this is unhelpful when the company is concerned about the 
turnover rate.124 
A number of Indian corporations have also joined the United Na-
tions Global Compact (UNGC), a business initiative for social responsi-
bility. Interestingly, one study suggests that firms unaffiliated with the 
UNGC that engage in CSR spend a higher percentage of sales on CSR 
than those firms who are associated with the UNGC.125 Many Indian 
firms view the UNGC from a learning and networking perspective; the 
UNGC “facilitates entry in the CSR arena within no time and at a mini-
mum cost to firms.”126 Some scholars have discounted the participation 
of Indian firms in the UNGC, finding that their participation has not 
brought any significant improvements in human rights, labor, environ-
ment, and corruption.127 The number of children employed in the work-
force is still around 12.6 million.128 Most Indian firms do not monitor 
their emissions or attempt to set strict caps on pollution.129 The overall 
corruption rate in India is still high; the myriad attempts to deal with cor-
ruption have had negligible impacts.130 
While CSR activities have been on the rise in India, they have not 
been undertaken without criticism and skepticism. Repeating Milton 
Friedman’s famous position, Orissa Finance Principal Secretary, JK Mo-
hapatra, stated that individual self-interest serves societal welfare, though 
he softened his position by suggesting that corporations should “pursue 
self interest in an enlightened manner to serve society.”131 Others have 
commented that CSR in its current form is “mere image-manship,” used 
to “cloak cynicism and irresponsibility,” and that, in order to be effec-
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tive, CSR must be delinked from philanthropy, and instead associated 
with “high standards in the core business of corporations in dealing with 
shareholders and clients and the communities they operate in.”132 
B. Incorporating CSR into Indian Corporate Law 
Over the past several years, the Indian government has attempted to 
transform CSR activities from a collection of good citizen-
ship/philanthropic activities undertaken by only the largest business 
houses to a way of doing business that involves the right combination of 
enhancing long-term shareholder value and protecting the interests of 
various other stakeholders (such as employees, creditors, consumers, and 
society at large). For example, in 2009, the government made it mandato-
ry for public-sector oil companies to spend 2% of their net profits on 
CSR.133 Currently, the government is considering regulating CSR in the 
private sector. The government had initially indicated that it would im-
pose mandatory CSR expenditures of between 2%–5% of a company’s 
net profits.134 Officials have been working on a way to quantify CSR.135 
The government has also been working to incorporate CSR standards 
into the amendment of the Indian Companies Act. 
1. Corporate Social Responsibility Voluntary Guidelines (2009) 
In the past year, the Indian government took steps to incorporate 
this broader vision of CSR into Indian corporate law. In late 2009, the 
MCA proposed groundbreaking CSR Guidelines in what has been 
deemed the first concrete attempt to recognize CSR from a regulatory 
standpoint.136 The CSR Guidelines constitute the outcome of committee 
sessions conducted by the Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs (IICA) 
with Advisory Expert Group members of the IICA-GTZ CSR Initiative, 
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a bilateral Indian/German project.137 The guidelines themselves attempt 
to frame CSR as part of Indian history and culture, stating: “Indian en-
trepreneurs and business enterprises have a long tradition of working 
within the values that have defined our nation’s character for millennia. 
India’s ancient wisdom, which is still relevant today, inspires people to 
work for the larger objective of the well-being of all stakeholders.”138 
The fundamental principle of the CSR Guidelines is that 
each business entity should formulate a CSR policy to guide its stra-
tegic planning and provide a roadmap for its CSR initiatives, and 
that this should be an integral part of overall business policy and 
aligned with a company’s business goals. The policy should be 
framed with the participation of various level executives and should 
be approved and overseen by the Board.139 
According to the CSR Guidelines, the CSR Policy should cover the 
following core elements: (i) care for all stakeholders, including share-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers, project-affected people, socie-
ty at large, etc.; (ii) ethical functioning, transparency, and accountability; 
(iii) respect for workers’ rights and welfare; (iv) respect for human 
rights; (v) respect for the environment; and (vi) activities for social and 
inclusive development.140 
While the guidelines have a very broad vision, they have a number 
of problems. The CSR Guidelines’ expansive and cursory treatment of 
many aspects of CSR does not assist companies to address where their 
CSR focus should be, and leaves much of this up to the corporations 
themselves. This is particularly problematic given the corporate gover-
nance shortcomings in India. Given the pervasive control of promoters in 
Indian firms, there is a danger that CSR will be reduced to a few phi-
lanthropic activities undertaken by the promoter. This could foster the 
continuation of a narrow view of CSR which does not necessarily trans-
late to greater social responsibility to a company’s employees or to the 
environment. 
The CSR Guidelines also provide little concrete guidance on how 
companies are to implement the guidelines or on what legal changes 
need to be made to ensure that socially responsible practices will be part 
of a firm’s way of doing business. It appears from the fundamental prin-
ciple of the guidelines that the board of directors will formulate and ap-
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prove CSR policies. Board members, however, may not have the know-
ledge or tools to undertake these efforts, but there has been little recogni-
tion of such shortcomings with respect to placing responsibility on direc-
tors to formulate and approve CSR policies. 
In addition, similar to the corporate governance Voluntary Guide-
lines, the CSR Guidelines are, as the name indicates, just guidelines. 
There is little in terms of enforcement. This is arguably positive, as the 
CSR guidelines are just the initial step into regulating CSR activities. 
Indeed, some experts have argued that CSR requirements might benefit 
from a “voluntary approach with stringent disclosure requirements that 
induce a culture of ‘comply-or-explain.’ This would help vigilant inves-
tors, particularly socially responsible and ethical investors, to either en-
gage with the companies to ensure they operate in a socially responsible 
manner or alternatively to exit such investments.”141 
2. CSR and Amendment of the Indian Companies Act 
In 2010, the MCA began to move toward incorporating CSR, and a 
more mandatory version of CSR, into the Companies Act. Thus far, the 
MCA has fluctuated between imposing mandatory CSR requirements 
into the Companies Act and adopting CSR recommendations with a 
“comply-or-explain” approach. Given the current inertia in actually pass-
ing the Companies Bill, it is not yet clear which vision will win out, al-
though given the vehement opposition to consideration of mandatory 
requirements one would expect that the MCA will adopt a more volunta-
ry approach. 
In line with the thorough examination of the Companies Bill (2009) 
by the Standing Committee of Parliament on Finance, which includes a 
review of the extent of CSR being undertaken by corporations and the 
need for a comprehensive CSR policy, the MCA indicated that it would 
introduce CSR requirements into the Companies Bill. An MCA press 
release in mid-2010 indicated that the Bill may now include provisions to 
mandate that every company with a net worth of at least Rs.500 crore 
(about $111 million), turnover of at least Rs.1000 crore (about $222 mil-
lion), or a net profit of at least Rs.5 crore (about $1.1 million) during a 
year would be required to formulate a CSR Policy to ensure that every 
year at least 2% of its average net profits during the three immediately 
preceding financial years would be spent on CSR activities as may be 
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approved and specified by the company directors.142 This proposal, 
which would have been a significant change to Indian corporate law, 
would have left to the discretion of individual companies, and particular-
ly to the boards of directors, to determine the manner in which the 
amounts would be deployed.143 
The proposed mandatory regime for CSR brought many detractors, 
including many Indian corporate lawyers. These critics noted that a man-
datory spend provision was essentially fruitless and would not necessari-
ly render a business socially responsible.144 For example, given the va-
gueness in the definition of CSR under the proposed Companies Act, a 
corporation in a line of business that causes significant detrimental envi-
ronmental impact could spend the mandatory funds on building a school 
in a unimpacted rural area rather than on ensuring that it decreased its 
adverse environmental impact. While this may not be all bad, it certainly 
falls short of an expansive stakeholder view of CSR. A requirement that 
companies spend a certain amount of money on CSR activities could po-
tentially lead to greater promoter abuse of corporate funds. Additionally, 
commentators argued that the MCA’s proposal “could provide greater 
scope for corruption and scams. Worse, this approach will undermine the 
very concept of CSR and reduce it to provision of lip service in the form 
of a check-the-box compliance.”145 
After much criticism, the MCA announced in late 2010 that it 
would not make any moves toward mandatory CSR efforts. Instead, the 
MCA stated that it would regulate CSR through a “comply-or-explain” 
approach, which requires that firms have a formal CSR policy targeting a 
2% spending allocation and to furnish details of funds going to social 
causes in an annual report.146 If a company does not have adequate profit 
or is not in a position to spend the prescribed amount on CSR, the regula-
tion would require the directors to provide disclosure and give suitable 
reasons in their annual report, with a view to checking non-
compliance.147 The recommendations do not explain in any detail what 
constitutes CSR. 
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This approach has also come under similar criticism with experts 
asking whether such provisions render CSR a more “check-the-box” ob-
ligation and detract from the broader vision of CSR.148 Commentators 
have worried whether 
the ambiguity on what constitutes spending on CSR, the manner in 
which the amounts should be deployed and whether corporations 
can give their mandatory spend[ing] to a trust or foundation run by 
the business itself can, in fact, lead Indian businesses [to] end[] up 
spending less than what they currently do on CSR.149 
One important aspect of the CSR Guidelines is the move toward 
additional disclosure. Very few Indian companies disclose their CSR 
policies, so additional disclosure could be a tool for NGO advocates and 
lawyers to work with companies and pressure them to comply with their 
CSR policies.150 A recent study of CSR reporting among India’s top 500 
companies found that around 49% of these companies were reporting on 
CSR, but in most reports there is no mention of amount spent.151 Many of 
these companies “are only making token gestures towards CSR,” work-
ing within the philanthropic model rather than the stakeholder model.152 
Another report found that CSR reporting is “qualitative rather than quan-
titative in nature,” and that most listed Indian companies do not have 
stand-alone CSR reports.153 There is also a larger focus on CSR outputs 
compared with CSR outcomes.154 Even for information technology com-
panies, CSR reporting on the Internet is “strikingly low.”155 
Indian firms may not clearly see the benefits of CSR reporting; 
when asked if there was a business case for CSR reporting, Indian com-
panies were unsure whether the benefits accrued from CSR were from 
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CSR reporting or actual CSR activities.156 The respondents were unsure 
to what extent the role of CSR reporting impacted employee morale, giv-
en that the CSR activities were already underway, and they doubted the 
efficacy of CSR reporting on employees below a certain level of manag-
ers.157 They also did not think CSR reporting improved customer rela-
tions because of their already strong reputations.158 But some companies 
saw value in CSR reporting, stating that they believed that institutional 
investors cared about CSR reporting.159 
C. Shortcomings of the Emerging CSR Model 
The potential for both corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility reforms in India is enormous. There are two important 
concerns, however, with the Indian government’s approach to CSR. 
First, the mandatory spend provision indicates a more philanthropic 
model of CSR rather than the broader stakeholder model. Instead of ap-
proaching CSR from a holistic viewpoint that addresses the activities of 
companies in a variety of areas, the government’s proposed changes to 
the Companies Act reduce CSR to a mere 2% spending provision. 
Second, the government seems to be seeking to capitalize on the cultural 
values of Indian firms, yet answers the CSR debate with the same solu-
tion that it has used with respect to corporate governance reforms—i.e., 
in large part pinning their hopes on directors. 
Both the CSR Guidelines and expected changes to the Companies 
Act would place the onus on the board of directors to supervise a compa-
ny’s CSR policies and to provide public reports on such policies, includ-
ing the amount of profits spent on CSR efforts. The problem with placing 
directors, and invariably independent directors, as central figures is that it 
could potentially exacerbate the weaknesses in the country’s corporate 
governance model without taking advantage of deep-rooted cultural 
norms or a broader vision for CSR. The truth is that directors in India 
still see themselves as strategic advisors to the promoter/founder. Thus, 
there is a high risk that CSR will not mean a wholesale change in the 
way a company does business, but will instead remain in the form of 
programs that emerge out of the founders’ desires to create alternatives 
that challenge existing models or as corporate practices that are shaped 
by founders’ underlying views about social reality and values. Further-
more, given India’s primary corporate governance problem (i.e., the do-
mination of promoters and majority stockholders), India’s proposed CSR 
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guidelines may exacerbate some of the problems that exist with respect 
to majority–minority agency costs; controlling stockholders could use the 
CSR funds on projects that may benefit the promoter at the expense of 
other shareholders or the company. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the late 1990s, Indian regulators, as well as Indian industry 
representatives and companies, have taken significant efforts to overhaul 
Indian corporate governance. Not only have reform measures been put 
into place prior to discovery of major corporate governance scandals, but 
both industry groups and government actors have sprung into action fol-
lowing the Satyam scandal. More recently, regulators have also at-
tempted to address CSR by Indian firms. These efforts, while praisewor-
thy, fall short of an expansive vision of CSR. Moreover, similar to the 
corporate governance regime, these efforts place much discretion and 
power in the hands of board members. The shortcomings discussed in 
this Article point to the need for reform of the corporate governance 
norms in India. These shortcomings warn that using the same solution in 
the CSR realm as the government has used to develop India’s corporate 
governance rules may be misguided. 
